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ABSTRACT
A positive productivity shock in the host country tends typically to increase the volume of the desired
FDI flows to the host country, through the standard marginal profitability effect. But, at the same
time, such a shock may lower the likelihood of making any new FDI flows by the source country,
through a total profitability effect, derived from the a general-equilibrium increase in domestic input
prices. This is the gist of the theory that we develop in the paper. For a sample of 62 OECD and
Non-OECD countries over the period 1987-2000, we provide supporting evidence for the existence
of such conflicting effects of productivity change on bilateral FDI flows. We also uncover sizeable
threshold barriers in our data set and link the analysis to the Lucas Paradox.
Assaf Razin






Maurice Obstfeld and Alan M. Taylor (2003) make a succinct observation :
"A century ago, world income and productivity levels were far less divergent
t h a nt h e ya r et o d a y ,s oi ti sa l l t h em o r er e m a r k a b l et h a ts om u c hc a p i t a l
was directed to countries at or below the 20 percent and 40 percent income
levels (relative to the United States). Today, a much larger fraction of the
world’s output and population is located in such low-productivity regions,
but a smaller share of global foreign investment reaches them." Earlier, in a
similar vein, Lucas (1990) put it like this: "Why doesn’t capital ﬂow from
rich to poor countries?" Indeed, the law of diminishing returns implies that
the marginal product of capital is high in poor, labor-abundant countries and
low in rich, capital-abundant countries. With a standard constant-returns-
to-scale production function, when the wage (per eﬃciency unit of labor) is
higher in the rich country (due to poor-rich country diﬀerences in relative
supplies of capital and labor), the return to capital must be lower in the rich
countries than in the poor country. Therefore, capital is expected to ﬂow
from rich to poor countries. In practice, however, this is not easily seen in
the data. Even though barriers to international capital mobility are by and
large being eliminated, the wage gap is still in force, and migration quotas
f r o mp o o rt or i c hc o u n t r i e sh a v et ob ee n f o r c e d 1.
1Lucas reconciles this paradox (with a simple theory and skillful calibration) by appeal-
ing to a human capital externality (proxied by average years of schooling) that generates a
Hicks-neutral productivity advantage for rich countries over poor countries.Note also that
despite the expansion of international trade in goods, still the Stolper-Samualson factor
price equalization theorem does not manage to eliminate the wage gap; see Stolper and
2The present paper focuses on foreign direct investment (FDI), as a key
channel of international capital ﬂows, which is expected to be closely as-
sociated with cross country productivity diﬀerences. We develop a model
with "lumpy" setup costs of new investments that govern the ﬂow of bilat-
eral foreign direct investment. Every country in this model may potentially
be a source for FDI ﬂows to several host countries; and each country may
be a host for FDI ﬂows from several source countries. But the rich and
technologically-advanced countries have a comparative advantage in setting
up foreign subsidiaries. As this advantage may also be industry-speciﬁc,
the model is capable of generating two-way rich-rich, and rich-poor FDI
ﬂows. With setup costs of investment, it does not pay a ﬁrm to make a
"small" foreign investment, even if such an investment is called for by mar-
ginal productivity conditions (that is, the standard ﬁrst-order conditions for
proﬁt maximization). Put diﬀerently, a typical foreign investment decision
is two-fold now: marginal productivity conditions determine how much to
invest, whereas a selection condition, based on total proﬁtability, determines
whether to invest at all.
Lucas (1990) focuses on capital ﬂows from rich to poor countries. This was
the major direction of ﬂows in the era of free capital mobility that preceded
World War I2. However, the increased mobility of capital that followed World
War II, and accelerated with the end of the Cold War, is of a diﬀerent nature.
As Obstfeld and Taylor (op. cit.) note: "Globalized capital markets are back,
but with a diﬀerence: capital transactions seem to be mostly a rich-rich
Samuelson (1941).
2Most notably were the ﬂows of capital from imperialist countries to their colonies.
3aﬀair, a process of ’diversiﬁcation ﬁnance’ rather than ’development ﬁnance’.
The creditor-debtor country pairs involve more rich-rich than rich-poor, and
today’s foreign investment in the poorest developing countries lag far behind
the levels attained at the start of the last century".
Threshold barriers play an important role in determining the extent of
trade-based foreign direct investment; see, for instance, Zhang and Markusen
(1999), Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001), and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple
(2003). The trade-based literature typically focuses on issues such as the
interdependence of FDI and trade in goods and the ensuing industrial struc-
ture. For instance, they attempt to explain how a source country can export
both FDI and goods to the same host country. The explanation rests on pro-
ductivity heterogeneity within the source country, and diﬀerences in setup
costs associated with FDI and export of goods. The trade-based literature
o nF D Ii st h u sg e a r e dt o w a r d saﬁrm-level decisions on exports and FDI in
t h es o u r c ec o u n t r y . O u rf o c u si so naggregate bilateral FDI. Thus, trade-
based empirical applications typically use micro dataset, whereas we utilize
country-wide data set.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops the model.
Section 3 demonstrates the conﬂicting eﬀects of productivity shocks. Sec-
tion 4 outlines the econometric approach and describes the data. Section 5
presents the empirical ﬁndings. Section 6 concludes.
42 The Model
In a nutsheel, the model of FDI works as follows. First, a potential FDI in-
vestor decides how much she would like to invest. This decision is governed
by the marginal proﬁtability considerations, so as to equate the marginal
factor productivity to factor prices (that is, the standard ﬁrst-order condi-
tion). In an econometric terminology, this decision is described by a ﬂow
(or "gravity") equation. Second, the potential FDI investor must also decide
whether to carry out at all new investments, because of ﬁxed costs of new
investments. The decision is governed by the total (rather than marginal)
proﬁtability of the new investment. In an econometric terminology, such de-
cision is described by the so-called selection equation. A productivity shock
i nt h eh o s tc o u n t r ym a y ,o nt h eo n eh a n d ,i n c r e a s et h ev o l u m eo ft h ed e s i r e d
FDI ﬂows to this country, but, on the other hand, and somewhat counter to
conventional thinking, the shock may lower the likelihood of making new FDI
ﬂo w sa ta l l ,b yt h es o u r c ec o u n t r y . As o u r c e - c o u n t r yp o s i t i v ep r o d u c t i v i t y
shocks has a negative eﬀect in the likelihood of making a new FDI, but is
inconsequential for the ﬂow of FDI. As we focus on aggregate bilateral capital
ﬂows in the econometric analysis, we specify in the theory background the
general productivity level of a country, and ignore for simplicity heterogeneity
among ﬁrms within a country 3.
Consider a representative industry in a given host country (H) in a world
of free capital mobility, which ﬁxes the world rate of interest, denoted by
r. As before, there is a single good which serves both for consumption and
3For notational simplicity we also set the number of ﬁrms in the industry to be equal
to one.
5investment. In a straightforward extension of the model to more than one
industry every country becomes potentially both a source for FDI ﬂows to
several host countries, and a host for FDI ﬂows from several source countries.
But because of ﬁxed costs, some of the source-host pairs are inactive.
As our focus here is on the country-speciﬁcp r o d u c t i v i t ys h o c k s ,w ew o u l d
like to reckon with the possibility that a productivity change aﬀects wages.
If the setup cost is in part in domestic (host-country) inputs, we have to take
into account the indirect eﬀect of a productivity change on the setup cost.
Therefore, we assume that the setup cost is of the form
CH = CSH + wHL
C
H, (1)
where CSH is a cost incurred in the source country and LC
H is a ﬁxed input
of domestic labor, proxying other domestic input prices.
Consider a representative ﬁr mw h i c hd o e si n v e s ti nt h eﬁrst period an
amount I = K − K0
H in order to augment its stock of capital to K. Its
present value becomes
V
+(AH,C H,w H)=m a x
(K,L)
½
AHF(K,L) − wHL + K
1+r






Input L stands for a variety of domestic inputs, such as labor, land,
etc. The demand of the ﬁrm for K and L are denoted by K+(AH,w H) and





Note again that the ﬁrm may choose not to invest at all (that is, to stick
to the existing stock of capital K0
H) and thereby avoid the lumpy setup cost













and its labor demand, denoted by L−(AH,K0






H,w H)) = wH. (6)
The ﬁrm will make a new investment if, and only if,
V




That is, the ﬁrm makes the amount of investment that is called for by the
marginal productivity conditions, (3) and (4), if and only if, a global selection
condition (7), is met.
As before, we assume that labor is conﬁn e dw i t h i nn a t i o n a lb o r d e r s .D e -
noting the country’s endowment of labor by L0
H, we have the following labor
market clearing equation:
LC




if V +(AH,C H,w H) ≥ V −(AH,K0
H,w H)






7This market clearing equation determines the wage rate in the host country,
as a function wH(AH) of the host-country productivity factor.4
3C o n ﬂicting Eﬀects of Productivity Shocks
We now turn to discuss the determinants FDI ﬂows from the source country
S to the host country H. We treat as FDI the investment of source-country
entrepreneurs in the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) of host-country ﬁrms.
Suppose that the source-country entrepreneurs are endowed with some "in-
tangible" capital, or know-how, stemming from their specialization or ex-
pertise in the industry at hand. We model this comparative advantage by
assuming that the lumpy setup cost of investment in the host country, when
investment is done by the source country entrepreneurs (FDI investors) is
below the lumpy setup cost of investment, if carried out by the host country
direct investors. This means that the foreign direct investors can bid up the
direct investors of the host country in the acquisition of the investing ﬁrms in
the host country. The representative ﬁrm is purchased at its value which is
V +[AH,C H,w H(AH)]. This essentially assumes that competition among the
foreign direct investors pushes the price of the acquired ﬁr mt oam a x i m i z e d
value. Thus, the FDI investors shift all the gains from their lower setup cost
to the host-country original owners of the ﬁrm. The new owners also invest
an amount K+[AH,w H(AH)] to expand the capital stock of the acquired the
ﬁrm. On the other hand, if the selection condition (7) does not hold, then
4See Appendix A for a derivation of the partial derivative of FDI with respect to the
productivity shock.
8there will be no FDI ﬂows from country S to country H. Thus, aggregate
foreign direct investment is equal to:
FDI =

      
      
V +[AH,C H,w H(AH)] + K+[AH,w H(AH)] − K0
H + wH(AH)L∗C
H
if V +[AH,C H,w H(AH)] ≥ V −[AH,K0
H,w H(AH)]
0




The model thus suggests that if the productivity factor (AH) is suﬃciently
high, and/or the wage rate (wH) is suﬃciently low, and/or the setup cost
(CSH +wHLC
H) is suﬃciently low, then FDI ﬂows from country S to country
H are positive. Otherwise, the ﬂow of FDI from country S to country H must
be zero.
As a preamble to our empirical analysis in the next part, recall that the
model’s special feature is the two-fold mechanism of FDI decisions. First,
one decides how much to invest abroad, while ignoring the ﬁxed setup cost.
Second, a decision is made whether to invest at all, taking into account
this cost. The hallmark of our empirical approach to follow is based on the
two equations (conditions) that govern these decisions. The deterministic
analogous of the "ﬂow" and the "selection" equations are as follows. First,
ignoring the setup cost, the FDI ﬂows from country S to country H (denoted
by FDI NOF) is govern by a "notional ﬂow" equation:
FDINOF = V
+[AH,C H,w H(AH)] + K






9That is, the quantity of investment (K+) and the acquisition price (V +) are
govern by the marginal productivity conditions (2) and (3). Second, the
question whether FDI ﬂows from country S to country H are at all positive
is govern by a "selection" equation (condition):
V
+[AH,C H,w H(AH)] − V
−[AH,K
0
H,w H(AH)] = 0. (11)
Consider now the eﬀect of a positive productivity shock which raises the
host country’s productivity factor, AH. As before, suppose initially that the
wage rate in the host country (wH) is ﬁxed [that is, ignore the labor market
clearing condition in equation (8)]. An increase in AH raises the quantity of
new investment (K+), if the investment is carried out at all, the acquisition
price (V +) that FDI investors pay, the amount of FDI, and the demand for
the labor in the host country. The increase in the demand for labor raise
t h ew a g er a t e( wH) in the host country (and the ﬁxed setup cost wHL∗C
H ),
thereby countering the above eﬀects on K+,V +,a n dF D I .W i t hau n i q u e
equilibrium, the initial eﬀects of the increase in AH are likely to dominate
the subsequent counter eﬀects of the rise in wH, so that FDI still rises5.
Thus, an increase in the host country’s productivity factor (AH) raises the
volume of FDI ﬂows from country S to country H that is governed by the ﬂow
equation. But, at the same time, the rise in AH increases also the value of
the domestic component of the setup cost, wH(AH)LC
H. Thus, it may weaken
5However, with ﬁxed setup cost the equilibrium need not to be unique, and an increase
in AH may, somewhat counter-intuitively, reduce FDI, possibly even to zero. For a similar
phenomenon, see Razin, Sadka and Coury (2003).
10the advantage of carrying out positive FDI ﬂows from country S to country H
at all. In other words, the gap between V + and V − in the selection equation
narrows down. Thus, a positive productivity shock (typically unobserved in
t h ed a t a )r a i s e st h eo b s e r v e dF D Iﬂows in the ﬂow equation but, at the same
time, may lower the likelihood of observing positive FDI ﬂo w sa ta l l .I no t h e r
words, the model may generate a negative correlation in the data between
the residuals of the ﬂow and selection equations.
The productivity level (AS) in the source country comes into play in the
selection decision, when we consider again the limited supply of entrepreneurs
in the source country. This consideration is particularly relevant for greenﬁeld
FDI. A source-country entrepreneur then faces a discrete choice of whether
to invest either at home or abroad, but not in both. In this case, in order for
her to make greenﬁeld FDI, it no longer suﬃces that V + exceeds V −;r a t h e r
V + must also exceed the value of alternative direct investment at home. The
latter naturally depends on the source-country productivity level, AS,a n d
we denote it by B(AS). That is, the selection condition is:
V








Thus, the source-country positive productivity shock aﬀects negatively
the selection decision, but it has no bearing on the ﬂow decision.
The FDI ﬂow mechanism works as follows. A comparative advantage for
the source country is based on low setup costs of direct investment, relative to
setup costs of domestic investors. This allows foreign investors to bid up for
investment projects in the host country. An exogenous productivity shock
in the host country may aﬀect the decision of the FDI investors whether to
11invest at all, and how much to invest, in opposite directions. For instance, a
positive productivity shock, ceteris paribus, improves both marginal and total
proﬁtability of new investment. But, it also raises the demand for labor and
consequently wages. The rise in wages, in turn, mitigates the initial rise in
the marginal proﬁtability and in the total proﬁtability of the new investment,
through its adverse eﬀect on variable costs. However, the increase in wage
costs does not completely oﬀset the initial rise in the marginal and total
productivity of new investments. As a result, the positive productivity shock
implies a net rise in the marginal proﬁtability of new investment. This may
not be the case with total proﬁtability. It is adversely aﬀected by the rise in
wages not only through the increase in the variable costs, but also through
the increase in the wage bill associated with setup costs. Hence, it may
well be the case that a positive productivity shock increases the marginal
productivity and lowers the total proﬁtability of new investments, at the
same time.6
4D a t a
We consider several potential explanatory variables of the two-fold decisions
on FDI ﬂows. These variables include standard ”mass” variables (the source
and host population sizes); ”distance” variables (physical distance between
the source and host countries and whether or not the two countries share a
6In Appendix B we extend the model to ﬁrm level heterogeneity. A productivity shock
may alter the composition of high vs low productivity ﬁrms that are actively invest. Thus,
there is an additional endogenous component to the eﬀect of productivity on FDI.
12common language); and ”economic” variables (source and host real GDP per
capita, source-host diﬀerences in average years of schooling, and source and
host ﬁnancial risk rating). We also control for country and time ﬁxed eﬀects.
The dependent variable in all the ﬂow (gravity) equations is the log of the
FDI ﬂows.
The main variables we employ are: (1) standard country characteris-
tics such as real GDP per-capita, population size, educational attainment
(as measured by average years of schooling), and ﬁnancial risk rating; (2)
(s,h) source-host characteristics, such as (s,h) FDI ﬂows, geographical dis-
tance, common language (zero-one variable); (3) productivity, i.e., output
per worker as measured by PPP-adjusted real GDP per worker. Table 1
summarizes the data sources. Table 2 describes the list of the 62 countries
in the sample, and indicates for each country, as a source or a host, whether
positive bilateral ﬂows are observed in the sample, at least once. Note that
most source countries do not interact more than with few host countries.
FDI data are drawn from the International Direct Investment database
(Source OECD), covering the bilateral FDI ﬂows among 62 countries (29
OECD countries and 33 Non-OECD countries) over the period 1987 to 2000.
T h eS o u r c eO E C Dp r o v i d e sF D Ii nU . S .d o l l a r sa n dw ed e ﬂate it by the U.S.
CPI for urban consumers.
5 Empirical Evidence
Our economic approach is based on Razin, Rubinstein and Sadka (2004),
where attention is paid to the problems that arise when FDI ﬂows are
13”lumpy”: FDI ﬂows are actually observed only when their proﬁtability ex-
ceeds a certain (unobserved) threshold. There are indeed around 62% host-
source pairs for which no FDI ﬂows appear in our data. This probably
indicates that the FDI ﬂows called for by the standard marginal produc-
tivity conditions are not large enough to surpass a certain threshold level,
rather than that the desired ﬂows, in the absence of a threshold, are actually
zero. Therefore, the Heckman selection method is adopted to jointly estimate
the likelihood of surpassing this threshold (the ”selection” equation) and the
magnitude of the FDI ﬂow, provided that the threshold is indeed surpassed
(the ”ﬂow” equation). 7
We jointly estimate the maximum likelihood of the ﬂow (gravity) equation
and the selection equation. We estimate the model under several alternative
assumptions concerning the missing observations on non OECD FDI out-
ﬂows to non OECD countries: we ignore these observations and alternatively
we treat them as “zeros”.8 We also use two alternatives for the data smooth-
ing: (1) unﬁltered annual data, and (2) two-year averages. In addition, we
present the estimation with and without instrumenting the potentially en-
dogenous output per worker variable. The estimation results are presented
in Tables 3-7.
7The traditional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) methods treat the no-ﬂow observations
as either literally indicating zero ﬂows, and assign a value of zero for the FDI in these
observations, or discard these observations altogether. In both cases the OLS estimates
are biased.
8The Source OECD dataset reports FDI outﬂows from OECD countries to OECD
and non OECD countries, as well as FDI outﬂo w sf r o mn o nO E C Dc o u n t r i e st oO E C D
countries. However, it does not report FDI outﬂows from non OECD to non OECD
countries.
14Table 3 presents the estimation of the equations for bilateral FDI ﬂow and
selection (ignoring missing observations on non OECD to non OECD out-
ﬂows, and using annual data).The eﬀect of the education variable, namely the
source-host diﬀerence in education levels, on the extensive margin (selection)
is signiﬁcant and negative, but not so on the intensive margin (ﬂow), across
diﬀerent alternative versions of the productivity variable. Host-country ﬁ-
nancial risk ratings is important in all models; but we ﬁnd no evidence for the
importance of the source on bilateral FDI ﬂows, neither on the intensive or
extensive margins.9 Host GDP per capita is important in the intensive mar-
gin only. As expected, and consistent with previous ”gravity” literature, we
ﬁnd that common language raises, and distance reduces the volume of FDI
ﬂows. Host population size has a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient in the ﬂow equation
but not in the selection equation. Source population size is insigniﬁcant in
either equation. The existence of past FDI relations is positive and signif-
icant in the selection equation, as it may help to reduce the setup costs of
establishing a new FDI ﬂow. Most importantly as a ”smoking gun” for the
existence of ﬁxed costs in the data, we note that:the correlation between the
error terms in the ﬂow and the selection equations is negative and signiﬁcant.
We turn now to the variables at the focus of the investigation, output per
worker. In Panel A the host output per worker has a positive eﬀect on the
intensive margin and negative eﬀe c to nt h ee x t e n s i v em a r g i n . B o t hc o e ﬃ-
cients are signiﬁcant. Source-country output per worker has a negative and
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the extensive margin, but has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
9The ﬁnancial risk rating ranges from 0 to 100, with higher index implying lower
ﬁnancial risk.
15intensive margin. In Panel B, with the productivity variables instrumented
by capital per worker and education attainment, the host output per worker
still signiﬁcantly aﬀects the extensive margin but is now insigniﬁcant in the
ﬂow equation. The source instrumented output per worker negatively aﬀects
both the intensive and the extensive margins. The past FDI dummy is used
as an exclusion restriction variable. The positive coeﬃcient is interpreted
as an indication for a lower threshold barrier for pairs of countries that had
positive FDI ﬂows in the past.
In Table 4 we present the estimation of the equation for bilateral FDI ﬂow
and selection (ignoring missing observations on non OECD to non OECD
outﬂows, and 2 year averages to smooth the data). In Table 5 we present
the estimation of the equations for bilateral FDI ﬂows and selection (treating
missing observations on non OECD to non OECD outﬂows as ”zeros” ). In
Table 6, likewise, we present the estimation of the equations for bilateral
FDI ﬂow and selection (treating missing observations on non OECD to non
OECD outﬂows as ”zeros”, and smoothed data ). Results are broadly similar
to Table 3, and provide evidence consistent with the key hypotheses about
the conﬂicting eﬀects of productivity changes.10
Note that the relationship in the selection equation between the prob-
ability (P) of making a new FDI and the explanatory variables (including
productivity) is not linear. It is rather given by








where α represents the eﬀect of all the other explanatory variables (held
ﬁxed at their sample averages), including country and time ﬁxed eﬀects,
and β is the coeﬃcient of prodH (output per worker in host country) in
t h es e l e c t i o ne q u a t i o n . N o t ea l s ot h a tt h ee s t i m a t eo fβ is negative and
statistically signiﬁcant. The marginal eﬀect of prodH on P is
∂P/∂prodH = β(2π)
−1/2 exp[−(α + βprodH)
2/2] < 0.11 (14)
Moreover, the expected value of FDI ﬂow is
E [FDI]=P(prodH)exp(δ + γprodH)+( 1− P(prodH)) · 0 (15)
where δ represents the eﬀect of all the other explanatory variables (held
ﬁxed at their sample averages), and γ is the coeﬃcient of prodH in the ﬂow
e q u a t i o n . N o t et h a tw eu s eexp(δ + γprodH) for the observed FDI ﬂow in
that our dependent variable in the ﬂow equation is the log of FDI. Therefore,
the marginal eﬀect of prodH on expected bilateral FDI ﬂows, normalized by











P(prodH)dprodH, is negative, while the second compo-
nent, γ, is positive (see Panel A in Table 3). The net eﬀect depends on which
11To complete the picture, note also that P(prod) has an inﬂection point at prod =
−α/β.
17component is the dominant force. Figure 1 depicts this normalized marginal
eﬀect for the U.S. as a source country, with all variables except prodH ﬁxed
at their sample average (based on Panel A in Table 3). Figure 1 clearly shows
that as productivity increases, its marginal impact decreases nonlinearly.12
Expected FDI ﬂows decline in the level of host country productivity .That
is, holding constant US productivity as a source country, the eﬀect of an in-
crease in the host country productivity depends crucially on the initial value
of the productivity parameter.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The paper is motivated by the well-known fact that most of FDI occurs
between a handful of countries. That is, bilateral FDI ﬂows between most
countries is in fact zero. The theoretical model highlights a possible channel
through which zeroes might be common in the data. The FDI ﬂow mechanism
works as follows. A comparative advantage for the source country is based
on low setup costs of direct investment, relative to setup costs of domestic
investors. This allows foreign investors to bid up for investment projects in
the host country. An exogenous productivity shock in the host country may
aﬀect the decision of the FDI investors whether to invest at all, and how
much to invest, in opposite directions. For instance, a positive productiv-
ity shock, ceteris paribus, improves both marginal and total proﬁtability of
new investment. But, it also raises the demand for labor and consequently
wages. The rise in wages, in turn, mitigates the initial rise in the marginal
12In our data sample, output per worker in host countries ranges from 2.45 to 86.6.
18proﬁtability and in the total proﬁtability of the new investment, through its
adverse eﬀect on variable costs. However, the increase in wage costs does
not completely oﬀset the initial rise in the marginal and total productivity
of new investments. As a result, the positive productivity shock implies a
net rise in the marginal proﬁtability of new investment. This may not be the
case with total proﬁtability. It is adversely aﬀected by the rise in wages not
only through the increase in the variable costs, but also through the increase
in the wage bill associated with setup costs. Hence, it may well be the case
that a positive productivity shock increases the marginal productivity and
lowers the total proﬁtability of new investments, at the same time.
T h ec o n c r e t ep r e d i c t i o nt h a tw et a k et ot h ed a t ai sa b o u tt h ec o n ﬂicting
eﬀects of productivity changes on FDI ﬂows: A positive productivity shock in
the host country typically increases the volume of the desired FDI ﬂows to the
host country, through the standard marginal proﬁtability eﬀect. But, at the
same time, the same shock may lower the likelihood of making any new FDI
ﬂows by the source country, through a total proﬁtability eﬀect, derived from
the a general-equilibrium increase in wages and other input prices. Using a
sample of 62 OECD and Non-OECD countries, over the period 1987-2000, we
provide supporting evidence for the existence of such eﬀects of productivity
changes on bilateral FDI ﬂow and the selection equations. That is, the
empirical ﬁndings is that productivity would aﬀect the aggregate ﬂows of
FDI in one way and the likelihood of positive FDI ﬂows in another.
Finally, we mention a potential caveat. The predictions from the model
with ﬁxed costs are predictions related to investment in capacity, but the
FDI ﬂow data captures ﬁnancial ﬂows associated with such investment. A
19fraction of FDI investment is often ﬁnanced in an aﬃliate’s host country,
coming from host country sources. To the extent that this fraction is not
correlated with the productivity shocks, the empirical predictions though
are not biased.
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236.0.1 Appendix A: Partial Equilibrium Eﬀect of A Productivity
Shock on FDI


















Total diﬀerentiation of equations (2) and (3) with respect to AH (while
















In equations (A3) and (A4) we assume that capital and labor are substitute
to each other in the production function, namely that FKL > 0. (Recall also
that FKKFLL − F2
KL > 0, FKK < 0,a n dFLL < 0, by the concavity of F.)
Equations (A1) - (A3) imply that ∂(FDI)/∂AH > 0.
Thus, for a given wH,a ni n c r e a s ei nAH raises FDI, and K+ and V +.
However, when new investment is made, equation (A4) implies that a rise
in AH increases the demand for labor. When no new investment is made, it







Thus, the demand for labor rises in this case as well.
246.1 Appendix B: Firm-Level Heterogeneity
Consider a pair of countries, "host" and "source", in a world of free capital
mobility which ﬁxes the world rate of interest, denoted by r.W e w i l l n o w
describe the host country, whose economic variables will be subscripted by
"H". The description of the source country is similar with a subscript "S".
Variables with neither H nor S subscript are identical for the two countries.
There is a representative industry whose product serves both for consumption
and investment. For simplicity suppose that existing ﬁrms will last for two
periods. In the ﬁrst period there exists a continuum of NH ﬁrms which diﬀer
from each other by a productivity index ε.W e r e f e r t o a ﬁrm which has a
productivity index of ε as an ε−ﬁrm. The cumulative distribution function
of ε is denoted by G(.), with a density function g(.).
We assume for simplicity that the initial net capital stock of each ﬁrm is
t h es a m ea n dd e n o t ei tb yK0
H.I fa nε−ﬁrm invests I in the ﬁrst period, it
augments its capital stock to K = K0
H +I, and its gross output in the second
period will be AHF(K,L)(1 + ε), where L is the labor input (in eﬀective
units) and AH is a country (H) - speciﬁc productivity parameter. Note that
ε is ﬁrm-speciﬁc, whereas AH is country-speciﬁc.
We assume that there exists a ﬁxed setup cost of investment, CH, which
is the same for all ﬁrms (that is, independent of ε). We assume that, due to
some (suppressed) ﬁxed factor, F is strictly concave, exhibiting diminishing
returns to scale in K and L. Note that the average cost curve of the ﬁrm is U-
shaped, so that perfect competition, which we assume, can prevail. Consider
an ε-ﬁrm which does invest in the ﬁr s tp e r i o da na m o u n tI = K − K0
H in




H,ε,w H)=m a x
(K,L)
½
AHF(K,L)(1 + ε) − wL+ K
1+r






where we assume for notational simplicity that capital does not depreciate.
The demands of such a ﬁrm for K and L are denoted by K+(AH,ε,w H)
and L+(AH,ε,w H).T h e ya r eg i v e nb yt h em a r g i n a lproductivity conditions:
AHFK(K,L)(1 + ε)=r, ((B2))
and
AHFL(K,L)(1 + ε)=wH, ((B3))
where FK and FL denote the partial derivatives of F with respect to K and
L, respectively. We assume that ε is bounded away from -1 by some ε > −1,
so that K+(AH,ε,w H) >K O
H for all ε.
Note, however, that an ε-ﬁr mm a yc h o s en o tt oi n v e s ta ta l l[ t h a ti s ,t o
stick to its existing stock of capital (KO
H)] and avoid the lumpy setup cost
CH. Naturally, a ﬁrm with a low ε may not ﬁnd it worthwhile to incur the













The labor demand of such ﬁrm, denoted by L−(AH,KO




H,L)(1 + ε)=wH. ((B5))
It is straightforward to show that (∂V +/∂ε)−(∂V −/∂ε) > 0 (see Appen-
dix 2B). Therefore, there exists a cutoﬀ level of ε,d e n o t e db yε0, such that an
ε-ﬁrm will make a new investment, if ε > ε0.T h i sc u t o ﬀ level of ε depends
on AH,C H,K0
H, and wH.W ew r i t et h ec u t o ﬀ ε as ε0(AH,C H,K0









We assume that labor is conﬁned within national borders. Denoting the
country’s endowment of labor in eﬀective units by ˜ L0


















where ¯ ε is the upper productivity level. Dividing the latter equation through

















H ≡ ˜ L0
H/NH is the eﬀective labor per ﬁrm.
Note that so similar market-clearing equation is speciﬁed for capital, be-
cause we assume that capital is freely mobile internationally, and its rate of
27return is equalized internationally. The same description with the subscript
"S" replacing "H" holds for the source country.
Note that diﬀerences in labor abundance between the two countries are
manifested in the wage diﬀerences. To see this, suppose that the two countries
a r ei d e n t i c a l ,e x c e p tt h a te ﬀective labor per ﬁrm is more abundant in the host
country than in the source country, that is: L0
H >L 0
S. If wages were equal in
the two countries, then eﬀective labor demand per ﬁrm were equal and the
market-clearing condition [equation (B.8)] could not hold for both countries.
Because of the diminishing marginal product of labor, it follows that the
wage in the relatively labor-abundant country is lower than in the relatively
labor-scarce country, that is: wH <w S
13. Thus, equal returns to capital
(through capital mobility coexist with unequal wages, as in Lucas (1990)14.
One may think of FDI as the investment of source-country entrepreneurs
in the acquisition of host-country ﬁrms. Suppose that the source-country
entrepreneurs are endowed with some "intangible" capital, or known-how,
stemming from their specialization or expertise in the industry at hand. We
model this comparative advantage by assuming that the setup cost of in-
vestment in the host country, when investment is done by source-country
entrepreneurs (FDI investors) is only C∗
H, which is below CH (the setup cost
of investment when carried out by the host country direct investors). One
13The equilibrium wage gap implies that the host country employs more workers per
ﬁrm than the source country. Thus, even though the productivity distribution across ﬁrms
is assumed equal, the source country is eﬀectively more productive in equilibrium.
14See also Amiti (1998) who studies the eﬀect of agglomeration on cross-regional wage
diﬀerences. See also Melitz (2003) for the role of ﬁxed costs in intra-industry reallocations
in reaction to industry-speciﬁc productivity shocks.
28may think of C∗
H as the research and development cost of a new product
line which is carried out by a parent ﬁrm in the source country. This cost
advantage implies that the foreign investors can bid up the direct investors
of the host country in the purchase of the investing ﬁrms in the host country.
Each such ﬁrms [that is, each ﬁrm whose ε is above ε0(AH,C∗
H,K0
H,w H)] is
purchased at its market value, which is V +(AH,C∗
H,K0
H,ε,w H). This essen-
tially assumes that competition among the foreign direct investors shift all
the gains from their lower setup cost to the host-country original owners of
the ﬁrm. The new owners also invest an amount K+(AH,ε,w H) − K0
H in
the ﬁrm. Thus, the amount of foreign direct investment made in an ε−ﬁrm















This speciﬁcation assumes that the setup cost C∗
H is incurred in the source
country and does not therefore constitute a part of the deﬁnition of FDI.
It conforms with the notion that C∗
H represents, for instance, R&D of a new
product line carried out by the parent ﬁrm in the source country.15 Aggregate
FDI is given by
15Whether we interpret C∗
H as being carried out in the source country or in the host
country, and accordingly whether we exclude it or include it in the deﬁnition of FDI does
















Suppose ﬁrst that wH is ﬁxed. Note that it follows from equation (B.1)
that ∂V +/∂K0
H =1 , by the envelope theorem. Therefore, ∂(FDI)/∂K0
H =0 ,
by equation (B1). Thus, the amount of FDI in a ﬁrm whose ε is above ε0
does not depend on the initial capital stock, K0
H:a ni n c r e a s eo f$1i nt h e
initial stock of capital of such a ﬁrm increases the value of the ﬁrm by 1$,
but decreases the required new investment by the same amount, so that FDI
does not change16. However, the aggregate amount of FDI diminishes, when
the initial stock of capital (K0
H) rises. This is because fewer ﬁrms will make
new investment and be purchased by foreign direct investors, that is, the
cutoﬀ ε0 rises, when K0
H rises. To see this, diﬀerentiate equation (B10) with
respect to K0




































16This is because, in the absence of a marginal adjustment cost of investment, the
marginal Tobin’s q is identically equal to one.
30Note that ∂V +
∂C∗
H = −1, by equation (B1), and that ∂ε0
∂C∗

























∂AH > 0 and ∂ε0
∂AH < 0.
Thus, a lower level of the initial stock of capital in the host country
attracts more foreign direct investment. Similarly, a lower level of the setup
cost of investment in the host country for the FDI investors from the source
country promotes more FDI17. Also, a higher country-speciﬁc productivity
factor in the host country promotes more FDI. These conclusions were drawn
under the assumption that the wage (wH) in the host country is ﬁxed. When
it is not ﬁxed, then lower K0
H and /or C∗
H attract more FDI and push the
wage rate upward, thereby mitigating the initial increase in FDI, but not
eliminating it altogether.
Observe that FDI ﬂows constitute only a fraction of the international
capital transactions between the host and source countries. In a globalized
world capital market, where the world rate of interest is given to our pair
of countries, domestic saving and domestic investment are not equal to each
other and FDI is not equal to either saving or investment.
So far, FDI took the form of mergers or acquisitions of existing ﬁrms.
17Interestingly, a decline in the setup cost aﬀects the average recorded productivity,
because the cutoﬀ ε changes. The new spectrum of investing ﬁr m si sa c c o r d i n g l ya d j u s t e d .
A similar endogenous-productivity mechanism features in Ghironi and Melitz (2004).
31Consider now the possibility of establishing a new ﬁrm (that is, a greenﬁeld
FDI, where K0 =0 ). Suppose that the newcomer entrepreneur does not
know in advance the productivity factor (ε) of the potential ﬁrm. The en-
trepreneur therefore takes G(.) as the cumulative probability distribution
of the productivity factor of the new ﬁrm. However, we assume that ε is
revealed to the entrepreneur, before she decides whether or not to make new










Note that if K0 is equal to zero, only the ﬁrms with an ε high enough to
justify a greenﬁeld investment have a positive value. This explains equation
(B.14).
Now suppose that greenﬁeld entrepreneurship is in limited supply and
capacity. An entrepreneur in a source country (and there is a limited number
of them) may have to decide whether to establish a new ﬁrm at home (the
source country) or abroad (the host country), but not in both. Her decision is
naturally determined by where V(.), as deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( B 1 4 ) ,i sh i g h e r .







Naturally, the lower wage rate in the host country works as a pull factor for
that country, that is, it works in the direction of satisfying condition (B.15).
Thus, the lower wage rate in the host country attracts greenﬁe l dF D I .O nt h e
32other hand, if the total factor productivity in the source country (namely,
AS) is higher than its counterpart in the host country (namely, AH),t h i s
discourages FDI. Assuming that the wage diﬀerential dominates the total
factor productivity diﬀerential, the host country attracts greenﬁeld FDI from
the source country.
Assuming that newcomer entrepreneurs evolve gradually over time and
that technology spillover equates total factor productivity, eventually this
process may end up with full factor price equalization. Naturally, the capital-
labor ratios and L ≡ e L/N are equalized in such long-run steady state. This
all happens even though labor is not internationally mobile. The establish-
ment of new ﬁrms in the global economy may be an engine for FDI ﬂows by
multinationals.
Our two-country model, which generates capital ﬂows from the source to
the host country, can be extended in a straightforward manner to explain
two-way FDI ﬂows. By assuming more than one industry, the extension
allows two-way ﬂows between two rich countries, when each country has a
setup cost advantage in a diﬀerent industry.
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Table 1: DATA SOURCE   
  
Variables: Source: 
FDI Flows  International Direct Investment Database (OECD) 
GDP   World Economic Indicators 
Population  World Economic Indicators 
Number of Workers  World Economic Indicators 
Distance  Andrew Rose's website: www.haas.berkeley.edu/~arose 
Common Language  Andrew Rose's website: www.haas.berkeley.edu/~arose 
Education Attainment  Barro-Lee Dataset, http://www.nber.org/pub/barro.lee/ 
ICRG Index of Financial Risk Rating  PRS Group 
Capital Stock  Francesco Caselli’s website: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/casellif 
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Table 2: FREQUENCY OF SOURCE-HOST INTERACTIONS BY COUNTRIES 
 
 
Country  Source Host  Country  Source Host 
Algeria  0.02 0.04  Korea  0.45 0.31 
Argentina  0.16 0.37  Kuwait  0.04 0.00 
Australia  0.24 0.32  Libya  0.02 0.02 
Austria  0.42 0.19  Malaysia  0.17 0.32 
Belgium  0.00 0.00  Mexico  0.05 0.38 
Brazil  0.18 0.37  Morocco  0.07 0.17 
Bulgaria  0.06 0.19  Netherlands  0.52 0.34 
Canada 0.22  0.23  Netherlands Antilles  0.07  0.03 
Chile  0.07 0.32  New  Zealand  0.16 0.19 
China  0.24 0.40  Norway  0.28 0.19 
Chinese  Taipei  0.24 0.29  Panama  0.06 0.06 
Colombia  0.08 0.18  Philippines  0.10 0.31 
Costa  Rica  0.03 0.02  Poland  0.12 0.30 
Czech  Republic 0.06 0.16  Portugal  0.25 0.30 
Czechoslovakia 0.02 0.02  Romania  0.07 0.20 
Denmark  0.36 0.23  Russia  0.15 0.27 
Egypt  0.06 0.21  Saudi  Arabia  0.07 0.06 
Finland  0.38 0.18  Singapore  0.29 0.37 
France  0.75 0.62  Slovak  Republic  0.02 0.08 
Germany  0.65 0.47  Slovenia  0.05 0.12 
Greece  0.07 0.17  South  Africa  0.15 0.24 
Hong Kong (China)  0.34  0.37  Spain  0.49  0.47 
Hungary  0.08 0.20  Sweden  0.42 0.28 
Iceland  0.14 0.09  Switzerland  0.46 0.22 
India  0.15 0.36  Thailand  0.10 0.35 
Indonesia  0.12 0.30  Turkey  0.10 0.20 
Iran  0.10 0.07  Ukraine  0.05 0.13 
Ireland  0.20  0.24  United Arab Emirates  0.03  0.04 
Israel  0.24 0.22  United  Kingdom  0.60 0.41 
Italy  0.52 0.36  United  States  0.63 0.47 
Japan  0.64 0.32  Venezuela  0.13 0.21   36
 
Table 3: Bilateral FDI Flows and Selection Equations  
(Observations on Non-OECD to Non-OECD FDI are excluded) 
 
  Panel A  Panel B 
 Flow  Selection  Flow  Selection 
Host-Output per worker  0.037 -0.026   
  (0.012)** (0.010)**    
Host-Instrumented output per worker      -0.020  -0.038 
     (0.016)  (0.012)** 
Source-Output per worker  0.002  -0.025    
 (0.014)  (0.009)**    
Source-Instrumented output per worker      -0.078  -0.023 
     (0.016)**  (0.013) 
       
GDP per capita - host^  1.373  0.345  2.192  0.163 
  (0.345)**  (0.250)  (0.289)**  (0.218) 
GDP per capita - source^  1.839 0.609  2.181  0.326 
  (0.431)** (0.276)*  (0.339)**  (0.226) 
Difference between schooling (source – host)   0.038  -0.097  0.058  -0.106 
 (0.042)  (0.032)**  (0.044)  (0.034)** 
Common language  0.728  0.323 0.727 0.321 
  (0.066)**  (0.055)** (0.066)** (0.055)** 
Distance (in Logs)  -0.982  -0.534 -0.984 -0.535 
  (0.027)**  (0.030)** (0.027)** (0.030)** 
Population-host^  -1.536  -0.483  -1.687  -0.303 
  (0.771)*  (0.613)  (0.773)*  (0.606) 
Population-source^ -1.332  0.708  -1.411  1.014 
  (0.912)  (0.649) (0.909) (0.642) 
Financial risk rating - source  0.003  0.001  -0.001  0.002 
  (0.007)  (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) 
Financial risk rating - host  0.018 0.013  0.011  0.011 
  (0.006)** (0.005)**  (0.006)  (0.005)* 
FDI flows from i to j a year ago ( =1 if yes)    1.599    1.602 
   (0.038)**    (0.038)** 
Correlation (Ui,j, Vi,j)  -0.064    -0.059   
  (0.028)*    (0.028)*   
Inverse Mills ratio  -0.092   -0.084   
  (0.041)*   (0.040)*   
Observations 17656       




      
Note: ^ in logs; Country and time fixed effects are included; Robust standard errors in parentheses;  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   37
 
Table 4: Bilateral FDI Flows and Selection Equations  
(Observations on Non-OECD to Non-OECD FDI are excluded;  
Two-year smoothing) 
 
  Panel A  Panel B 
 Flow  Selection  Flow  Selection 
Host-Output per worker  0.032  -0.004    
  (0.015)**  (0.012)    
Host-Instrumented output per worker      -0.032  -0.021 
     (0.020)  (0.018) 
Source-Output per worker  -0.007  -0.018     
 (0.016)  (0.012)     
Source-Instrumented output per worker      -0.101  -0.015 
     (0.020)**  (0.018) 
        
GDP per capita - host^  1.371  0.216  2.234  0.260 
  (0.473)**  (0.367)  (0.380)**  (0.307) 
GDP per capita - source^  1.595  0.291  1.771  0.041 
  (0.509)**  (0.404)  (0.396)**  (0.321) 
Difference between schooling (source – host)   0.024  -0.081  0.045  -0.084 
 (0.053)  (0.044)  (0.055)  (0.046) 
Common language  0.778 0.299  0.779  0.298 
  (0.081)** (0.072)**  (0.081)**  (0.072)** 
Distance (in Logs)  -1.042 -0.591  -1.046  -0.592 
  (0.034)** (0.042)**  (0.034)**  (0.042)** 
Population-host^ -0.830  -1.721  -0.750  -1.729 
 (0.944)  (0.858)*  (0.948)  (0.853)* 
Population-source^ 0.375  -0.588  0.516  -0.359 
 (1.096)  (0.847)  (1.097)  (0.850) 
Financial risk rating - source  -0.009  -0.006  -0.015  -0.005 
 (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.007) 
Financial risk rating - host  0.013  0.014  0.004 0.012 
 (0.008)  (0.007)*  (0.008) (0.007) 
FDI flows from i to j a year ago ( =1 if yes)    1.405    1.406 
   (0.050)**    (0.050)** 
Correlation (Ui,j, Vi,j)  -0.061    -0.056   
 (0.034)    (0.034)   
Inverse Mills ratio  -0.085    -0.079   
 (0.048)    (0.047)   
Observations  9689     




     
Note: ^ in logs; Country and time fixed effects are included; Robust standard errors in parentheses;  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 5: Bilateral FDI Flows and Selection Equations  
(Observations on Non-OECD to Non-OECD FDI are included) 
 
  Panel A  Panel B 
 Flow  Selection  Flow  Selection 
Host-Output per worker  0.037 -0.026    
  (0.012)** (0.009)**    
Host-Instrumented output per worker      -0.019  -0.040 
     (0.016)  (0.012)**
Source-Output per worker  0.001  -0.023    
 (0.014)  (0.009)**    
Source-Instrumented output per worker      -0.078 -0.025 
     (0.016)** (0.012)* 
        
GDP per capita - host^  1.374  0.277  2.193  0.126 
  (0.345)**  (0.228)  (0.289)**  (0.204) 
GDP per capita - source^  1.845 0.527  2.185  0.312 
  (0.431)** (0.257)*  (0.339)**  (0.214) 
Difference between schooling (source – host)   0.037  -0.091  0.058  -0.098 
 (0.042)  (0.031)**  (0.044)  (0.033)**
Common language  0.730 0.294  0.729  0.291 
  (0.066)** (0.051)**  (0.066)**  (0.051)**
Distance (in Logs)  -0.986 -0.385  -0.988  -0.387 
  (0.027)** (0.023)**  (0.027)**  (0.024)**
Population-host^  -1.549  -0.733  -1.698  -0.512 
  (0.771)*  (0.558)  (0.773)*  (0.554) 
Population-source^ -1.316  0.385  -1.395  0.709 
 (0.912)  (0.599)  (0.909)  (0.595) 
Financial risk rating - source  0.003  0.000  -0.001  0.000 
 (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.005) 
Financial risk rating - host  0.018  0.009 0.011  0.008 
  (0.006)**  (0.005) (0.006)  (0.005) 
FDI flows from i to j a year ago ( =1 if yes)    1.691    1.694 
   (0.037)**    (0.037)**
Correlation (Ui,j, Vi,j)  -0.058   -0.052   
  (0.027)*   (0.027)   
Inverse Mills ratio  -0.083   -0.075   
  (0.039)*   (0.039)   
Observations 21406       




      
Note: ^ in logs; Country and time fixed effects are included; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 6: Bilateral FDI Flows and Selection Equations  
(Observations on Non-OECD to Non-OECD FDI are included; 
 Two-year smoothing) 
 
 Panel  A  Panel  B 
 Flow  Selection  Flow  Selection 
Host-Output per worker  0.032  -0.004    
  (0.015)**  (0.012)    
Host-Instrumented output per worker      -0.032  -0.018 
     (0.020)  (0.017) 
Source-Output per worker  -0.007  -0.014     
 (0.016)  (0.011)     
Source-Instrumented output per worker      -0.101  -0.018 
     (0.020)**  (0.017) 
        
GDP per capita - host^  1.369  0.103  2.233  0.155 
  (0.473)**  (0.329)  (0.380)**  (0.285) 
GDP per capita - source^  1.602  0.194  1.773  0.062 
  (0.509)**  (0.371)  (0.396)**  (0.301) 
Difference between schooling (source – host)   0.024  -0.069  0.045  -0.069 
 (0.053)  (0.041)  (0.055)  (0.044) 
Common language  0.781 0.257  0.781  0.256 
  (0.081)** (0.066)**  (0.081)**  (0.066)** 
Distance (in Logs)  -1.047 -0.398  -1.050  -0.399 
  (0.034)** (0.031)**  (0.034)**  (0.031)** 
Population-host^ -0.851  -2.409  -0.767  -2.354 
 (0.940)  (0.781)**  (0.944)  (0.784)** 
Population-source^ 0.385  -0.791  0.527  -0.566 
 (1.096)  (0.776)  (1.096)  (0.786) 
Financial risk rating - source  -0.009  -0.007  -0.015  -0.007 
 (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.007) 
Financial risk rating - host  0.013  0.014  0.004 0.012 
 (0.008)  (0.006)*  (0.008) (0.007) 
FDI flows from i to j a year ago ( =1 if yes)    1.517    1.518 
   (0.049)**    (0.049)** 
Correlation (Ui,j, Vi,j) -0.050    -0.045   
 (0.033)    (0.033)   
Inverse Mills ratio  -0.071    -0.063   
 (0.047)    (0.046)   
Observations 11828       




      
Note: ^ in logs; Country and time fixed effects are included; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 7: The Instrumented Productivity Equation
 




















Note: Country and time fixed effects are included;  
Standard errors in parentheses; ** significant at 1% 
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